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Philosophers traditionally recognize two key features of mental states:
intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, in-
tentionality is the “aboutness” of mental states, and phenomenal conscious-
ness is the felt, experiential, qualitative, or “what it’s like” (Nagel 1974)
aspect of mental states. In the past few decades, these features have been
widely assumed to be distinct and independent. But several philosophers
have recently challenged this assumption, arguing that intentionality and
consciousness are importantly related. This article overviews the key views
on the relationship between consciousness and intentionality and describes
our favored view, which is a version of the phenomenal intentionality the-
ory, the view that the most fundamental kind of intentionality arises from
phenomenal consciousness.1
1This article overviews many ideas that are developed in greater depth in Mendelovici
2018.
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1 Consciousness and intentionality
Phenomenal consciousness is the felt, experiential, qualitative, or “what it’s
like” (Nagel 1974) aspect of mental states. Some paradigm examples of men-
tal states that exhibit phenomenal consciousness are sensations (e.g., pains,
visual experiences) and emotional feelings (e.g., feelings of sadness or elation).
For present purposes, we can define (phenomenal) consciousness ostensively
as the salient feature of such states that is naturally described using terms
like “what it’s like” and “experience”. Mental states, such as the emotion of
joy or the perception of a rose, may have multiple properties, some of which
are phenomenal and others of which are not. It is useful to have a term des-
ignating the purely phenomenal features of mental states. We will refer to
these features as phenomenal properties and to instantiations of phenomenal
properties as phenomenal states.
Above, we offered a gloss of intentionality as “aboutness”. This character-
ization, which is common in the literature, is merely a first approximation,
rather than a strict definition. It is a fairly loose way of describing a phe-
nomenon that we are able to at least sometimes notice introspectively in
ourselves. The phenomenon is exemplified by thoughts, the kinds of mental
states that we enjoy when we think, as well as by visual perceptual expe-
riences. Both in thought and in visual experience, our mental states seem
to “say” something, or be “about”, “of”, or “directed” at something, and it
seems this requires no corresponding external entity or state of affairs. For
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example, a perceptual experience might be described as being “about” a cup,
and a thought might be described as “saying” that grass is green. We take in-
tentionality to be this phenomenon that we notice introspectively in at least
some cases and that we are tempted to describe using representational terms
like “says”, “about”, “of”, and “directedness”.2 A state’s (intentional) content
is that which we are tempted to describe as what an intentional state “says” or
is “directed at”. We will say that intentional states (intentionally) represent
their intentional contents. While we are primarily concerned with intentional
contents and intentional representation, we allow that there are other (ar-
guably looser and more permissive) everyday uses of the term “represent” and
that we can speak of the “contents” that are thus represented. As in the case
of phenomenal consciousness, complex mental states might exhibit intention-
ality along with other features. We will call the purely intentional features
of mental states intentional properties and the instantiations of intentional
properties intentional states.3
2See Mendelovici 2010, 2018 and Kriegel 2011b for further development of ostensive
ways of defining “intentionality”. One of us (DB) has tended to prefer a different definition
of “intentionality” as a non-factive relation to propositions, which may or may not pick
out the same thing as our present definition. DB’s more theoretically-loaded definition
is suitable for his project in Bourget 2010a, 2010b, 2015, 2017a, 2017c, 2017d, 2017b,
forthcoming a, and forthcoming b, where his aim is to shed light on consciousness in terms
of non-factive relations to propositions. Part of our aim here, however, is to discover the
nature of a phenomenon that we can introspectively observe in ourselves, so employing
DB’s definition, or any other definition making substantive commitments with respect
to the nature of intentionality, would beg the question in favor of certain views of the
introspectively observed phenomenon. This is why we employ an ostensive definition for
our purposes. See Mendelovici 2018 for an explicit defense of such an approach.
3The term “intentional state” is sometimes used to mean a state that has intentional
properties. Since we are primarily interested in the relationship between consciousness
and intentionality, and not the relationship between consciousness and other features of
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Like our definition of “consciousness”, our definition of “intentionality”
is ostensive. In the case of intentionality, our paradigm cases are thoughts
and visual experiences. Standing propositional attitudes, such as beliefs that
one counts as having even when not occurrently entertaining them, are also
sometimes taken to be central cases of intentionality. However, we choose
not to include standing propositional attitudes in our paradigm cases because
they are not immediately observable through introspection in the same way
that many thoughts and visual experiences are, and we believe that, when
possible, it is preferable for ostensive notions to be grounded in the most
immediately observable cases available.4 Of course, how we define “inten-
tionality” is merely a terminological choice. We will discuss this choice again
when it becomes relevant below.
2 Three views of the relationship between con-
sciousness and intentionality
Many mental states have both intentional properties and phenomenal prop-
erties. For example, when you see a rose, there is something it is like for you
to see the rose, and your mind is seemingly directed at something, such as a
states that might happen to be intentional, such as their “modes” or “attitudes”, we use
the term “intentional state” to pick out instantiations of intentional properties. On our
usage, an instance of representing that grass is green is an intentional state, while a belief
that grass is green is a mental state that involves the intentional state of representing that
grass is green.
4See also Mendelovici 2018, §1.4.2.
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rose or a possible state of affairs involving a rose. It is natural to ask what
is the relationship between these two mental features. Roughly following
Horgan and Tienson (2002a), we can distinguish three main views on this
question: According to representationalism, all actual phenomenal states are
nothing over and above, or arise from, intentional states (perhaps together
with other ingredients).5 According to the phenomenal intentionality theory
(PIT), all actual intentional states, or at least all actual originally inten-
tional states (more on this below), arise from phenomenal states.6 According
to separatism, neither kind of state arises from the other.
The notion of a set of states A arising from another set of states B is
supposed to capture the intuitive idea that the states in A are nothing over
and above the states in B. There are different ways in which a set of states
A can arise from another set of states B: Every state in A might be identical
to, grounded in, constituted by, or realized by some states in B (or some
combination of such states).
Representationalism is often thought of as offering a theory of conscious-
ness in that it tells us what consciousness arises from. According to repre-
sentationalism, some intentional states, by their very nature, and perhaps
together with the help of certain further ingredients, are phenomenally con-
scious or automatically result in phenomenal states. For example, a percep-
tual state representing a red square might, simply in virtue of representing a
5Introductions to representationalism include Lycan 2000, Bourget and Mendelovici
2014, and Seager and Bourget 2007.
6Introductions to PIT include Kriegel 2013 and Bourget and Mendelovici 2016.
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red square, automatically have a “reddish” phenomenal character.
Similarly, PIT is often thought of as offering a theory of intentionality
in that it tells us what intentionality arises from. According to PIT, certain
phenomenal states, all by themselves, automatically give rise to intentional
states. For example, a perceptual state with a “reddish squarish” phenomenal
character might, all by itself, automatically result in the representation of a
red square, or of there being a red square.7
Separatism denies both representationalism and PIT, maintaining that we
cannot have a theory of consciousness in terms of intentionality or a theory
of intentionality in terms of consciousness. The separatist might say that,
although many states are both intentional and phenomenal, the intentional
and the phenomenal are largely independent of one another. For example,
a separatist might say that it is possible for a perceptual state to have a
“reddish” phenomenal character but to represent the property of being green.8
A strong and simple form of representationalism states that all actual
phenomenal states arise from intentional states alone. A strong and simple
form of PIT states that all actual intentional states arise from phenomenal
states alone. Most representationalists and phenomenal intentionality theo-
rists do not hold these simple views. The main reason is that these views
7While PIT is primarily a view of how we represent various contents, many advocates
of PIT and nearby views have also argued that the attitude components of propositional
attitude states, like the belief component of the belief that grass is green, arise from
phenomenal consciousness (Horgan and Tienson 2002a, Pitt 2004, Jorba 2016, Mendelovici
2018, Appendix E).
8See especially Block 1990 and 1996 for arguments for such a separatist view.
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face challenges with intentional states that are not accompanied by any phe-
nomenal states, such as the standing propositional attitudes that one has on
a continuous basis (even when sleeping dreamlessly) and intentional states
involved in early visual or linguistic processing that we are not aware of hav-
ing. Given the reasonable assumption that such states can have the same
contents as states that are accompanied by phenomenal consciousness, the
simple version of representationalism faces a challenge, since these cases seem
to show that phenomenal consciousness is not just a matter of having partic-
ular intentional states. Intentional states without accompanying phenomenal
states also challenge the simple version of PIT because they seem to show
that not all actual intentional states arise from phenomenal states.
These challenges have helped motivate weakened versions of representa-
tionalism and PIT. The simple version of representationalism described above
is sometimes called pure representationalism, since it claims that all phenom-
enal states arise from intentional states alone. According to pure represen-
tationalism, all that matters for phenomenal consciousness is intentionality.
The weakening of this view that is thought to avoid the above-mentioned
problems is impure representationalism, which claims that all actual phe-
nomenal states arise from intentional states combined with other ingredients,
which might include functional roles, ways of representing, or intentional
modes similar to the attitude components of propositional attitudes.9 Im-
pure representationalism can deal with the problem cases mentioned above by
9See Chalmers 2004 for the distinction between pure and impure representationalism.
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denying that standing propositional attitudes and other non-phenomenally
conscious states have the extra ingredients required for being phenomenally
conscious.10
In the case of PIT, a different distinction is typically made. Let us call
intentionality that arises from phenomenal consciousness alone phenomenal
intentionality. A phenomenal intentional state is an intentional state that
arises from one or more phenomenal states alone, and a phenomenal inten-
tional state’s content is its phenomenal content. The simple version of PIT
mentioned above takes all intentionality to be phenomenal intentionality. We
will refer to it as strong PIT. Moderate PIT is a weakening of this view ac-
cording to which some intentional states are phenomenal intentional states,
and all other intentional states derive in some way from phenomenal inten-
tional states.11 While moderate PIT recognizes non-phenomenal intention-
ality, it nevertheless maintains that phenomenal consciousness is the source
of all intentionality (Kriegel 2011b, 2013).
Moderate PIT can be equivalently understood by use of a distinction
10Some versions of impure representationalism take the relevant extra ingredients to
merely determine whether a phenomenal state arises given the presence of a particular
intentional state—which phenomenal state it is that arises is determined by the content of
the corresponding intentional state. This kind of impure representationalism is sometimes
labeled intermodal representationalism, following Byrne (2001). Intramodal representa-
tionalism, in contrast, is a version of impure representationalism that takes the extra
ingredients to help determine not only whether a phenomenal state arises given the pres-
ence of a particular intentional state, but also which phenomenal state it is that arises
(see Lycan 1987). Bourget (2010a, 2010b, 2015, 2017b and 2017d, forthcoming) argues for
intermodal representationalism and against intramodal representationalism.
11See Bourget and Mendelovici 2016 and Mendelovici 2018 for the distinction between
strong PIT and moderate PIT. In Mendelovici and Bourget 2014, we use the terms “ex-
treme PIT” and “strong PIT” to mark this distinction.
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that is sometimes drawn between original and derived intentionality. De-
rived intentionality is intentionality that derives from other actual or merely
possible instances of intentionality, while original intentionality is intention-
ality that is not derived. For example, it is sometimes thought that linguistic
intentionality is a kind of derived intentionality in that the intentionality of
linguistic expressions derives from the original intentionality of mental states.
Moderate PIT, then, is the view that all original intentionality is phenom-
enal intentionality and any other intentionality is (ultimately) derived from
phenomenal intentionality.12
Impure representationalism and moderate PIT weaken the simple ver-
sions of representationalism and PIT, respectively, but in different ways.13
Impure representationalism denies that all actual phenomenal states arise
from intentional states alone, allowing that ingredients apart from inten-
tionality matter for phenomenal consciousness. Moderate PIT, in contrast,
rejects the requirement that all actual intentional states arise from phenom-
enal states alone, allowing that some intentional states do not arise from
phenomenal states, so long as they are instances of derived intentionality.
Why does the representationalist deny the “alone” part of the simple ver-
12Proponents of moderate PIT, or something close to it, include Bourget (2010a), Farkas
(2008a,b), Horgan and Tienson (2002b), Horgan et al. (2004), Kriegel (2003, 2011a,b),
Loar (2003a), Searle (1992), Mendelovici (2010, 2018), Mendelovici and Bourget (2014),
Montague (2016), Pitt (2004, 2009, 2011), Pautz (2013), Siewert (1998), Smithies (2011,
2013a,b, 2014). See Section 4 of this article and Mendelovici 2018 for a defense of strong
PIT. Bourget (2017c, 2018) also defends a view in the spirit of strong PIT.
13There are also weakened versions of PIT that weaken PIT by taking intentionality to
arise from phenomenal consciousness together with other ingredients. Farkas (2013) and
Masrour (2013) defend such views.
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sion of her view while the advocate of PIT denies the “all” part of the simple
version of her view? Recall that the representationalist aims to account for all
phenomenal states, which involves specifying the conditions under which we
have particular phenomenal states. Since intentional states do not uniquely
determine phenomenal states, she cannot do so by invoking intentional states
alone; she must invoke extra ingredients apart from intentionality. So, the
simple version of representationalism is most naturally weakened to impure
representationalism.
In contrast, the advocate of PIT aims to account for intentional states,
which involves specifying the conditions under which we have any given in-
tentional state. But, since phenomenal states are thought not to be neces-
sary for all intentional states, she at best can only use phenomenal states
alone to specify the conditions under which we have a subset of intentional
states—these are the states with phenomenal intentionality. The intentional
states that do not correspond to phenomenal states must be accounted for in
some other way. This motivates weakening the simple version of PIT to mod-
erate PIT, which takes some intentional states to be a matter of phenomenal
consciousness alone and others to have merely derived intentionality.
The above points show that although the weakenings of the simple ver-
sions of representationalism and PIT are superficially quite different with
respect to their methods of weakening, there is a deep agreement between
the two strategies in that they both aim to accommodate intentional states
that do not correspond to phenomenal states.
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Before moving on, it is worth noting that, as we’ve defined the views,
some, but not all, forms of representationalism and PIT are compatible with
each other. For example, since identity is not asymmetric, some versions of
representationalism and PIT taking the relevant arising relations to be iden-
tity relations are compatible with each other.14 In contrast, versions taking
the relevant arising relations to be grounding relations are not compatible
with each other, since grounding is an asymmetric relation, so intentionality
cannot ground consciousness while consciousness grounds intentionality.15
Since another paper in this volume is focused on representationalism, the
rest of this paper will focus on PIT.
3 Motivating PIT
This section describes what we take to be a central motivation for accepting
PIT as a theory of intentionality. The next section explores challenges to
PIT and develops our favored version of PIT in response, which, we will see,
is a version of strong PIT.16
As mentioned above, PIT can be understood as a theory of intentionality,
14We believe that identity versions of both views are true and have defended representa-
tionalism elsewhere. See Mendelovici 2018, Ch. 6 for discussion of why the compatibility
of representationalism and PIT does not necessarily threaten the claim that the views
provide theories of consciousness and intentionality, respectively.
15We explore other aspects of the relationship between representationalism and PIT in
Bourget and Mendelovici 2016.
16See Bourget and Mendelovici 2016 and Kriegel 2013 for extensive discussions of a
broad range of motivations, and Mendelovici 2018 for a more detailed treatment of the
arguments presented here.
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a theory that tells us what intentionally really is, metaphysically speaking.
It is not a naturalistic theory in the traditional sense of a theory couched
in physical-functional language, but it is nonetheless an attempt to explain
intentionality, i.e., to describe its nature. Arguably, much of the interest
in PIT stems from dissatisfaction with alternative theories of intentionality.
In our view, one of the most important motivations for PIT is that its main
competitors face unforgivable problems concerning empirical adequacy, while
PIT does not.17
PIT’s two main competitors are tracking theories and functional role theo-
ries. Tracking theories of intentionality maintain that original intentionality
arises from tracking, which is detecting, carrying (or having the function
of carrying) information about, or otherwise appropriately corresponding to
items in the environment, such as particular objects, properties, or states of
affairs. The tracking relations that have been thought to explain intention-
ality are supposed to be entirely reducible to physical features in the fashion
championed by such authors as Dretske (1988, 1993), Fodor (1990a,b), and
Millikan (1984).
Functional role theories maintain that original intentionality arises from
functional roles, where the functional role of an inner representation (un-
derstood as some kind of token in the head) is the sum-total of the causal
17See also Kriegel 2013 and Mendelovici and Bourget 2014 for a critical assessment of
PIT in comparison to alternative theories of intentionality, particularly the tracking theory.
In Mendelovici and Bourget 2014, we also argue that PIT is naturalistic in the sense of
“naturalism” that matters most.
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relations that it is disposed to enter into with other inner representations, in-
put stimuli (e.g., retinal stimulation), and outputs (e.g., bodily movements).
On most versions of the view, it is only a subset of these causal relations
that is required and relevant for intentionality, usually those causal relations
corresponding to “correct” inferences. A hybrid theory taking original inten-
tionality to arise from a combination of functional roles and tracking relations
is also possible, and is sometimes called a long-arm functional role theory (see
Harman 1987).
Tracking and functional role theories of intentionality have received con-
siderable attention over the past few decades. For some time, it appeared
that “naturalizing” intentionality by accounting for it in terms of tracking or
functional roles was one of the most important goals in philosophy of mind.
But this research program has lost momentum. Over time, it has become
clear that offering an empirically adequate theory of intentionality in terms
of tracking or functional role (let alone one that is genuinely explanatory) is
very challenging.
Many challenges to the empirical adequacy of tracking theories have been
lodged, most of which work against some tracking theories but not others.
Rather than provide a general overview of these challenges here, we will
focus on one kind of challenge to empirical adequacy that tracking theorists
themselves have hardly discussed. The problem is that there are large classes
of cases in which what a representation represents doesn’t match anything
it can plausibly be said to match. Such cases are mismatch cases, and the
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problem that they pose for tracking theories is the mismatch problem. Below
we will describe one mismatch case, that of perceptual color representations.
Intuitively, when we visually represent the color red, we represent the
vivid, striking, and warm quality that many of us are familiar with. Let us
stipulate that this is what we mean by “redness”. If our visual states repre-
senting redness have their contents in virtue of what they track, they have
to represent properties available to be tracked, which, on most tracking the-
ories, are properties that are or have been instantiated in the actual world.18
According to our best scientific understanding of apparently colored objects,
the best candidate properties that are available for perceptual experiences
of redness to track are properties such as the property being disposed to
primarily reflect electromagnetic radiation of wavelengths of around 650nm.
Call this property EM650. It is not very important here what is the best can-
didate physical basis of color, so we will use EM650 as an example without
further discussion of other options. The problem for tracking theories is that
redness, the property that we visually represent, and EM650, the property
that our visual states track, seem to be entirely different properties. One is
categorical, vivid, striking, and warm. The other is dispositional and has to
do with electromagnetic radiation and wavelengths. The two properties differ
18There are tracking theories that allow us to track properties that have never been
instantiated, such as Fodor’s asymmetric dependence view. However, the asymmetric
dependence theory requires lawful connections between tracked properties and inner rep-
resentations to obtain and be relatively strong, which is a condition that is not plausibly
met in the kinds of cases we will discuss, so it does not help the tracking theorist avoid
the mismatch problem. See Mendelovici 2013b, 2016, 2018, Appendix A for more details.
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in their higher-order properties, so, by Leibniz’s law of the indiscernability
of identicals, they are distinct properties. The same problem arises in other
cases, such as experiences of hotness and coldness, sweetness, moral or other
kinds of value, and thoughts about many of these same contents.19
There are many objections one might make to the mismatch problem. We
will only discuss one, which we think might seem particularly compelling20:
One might object that apparent differences between EM650 and redness are
illusory. One might draw an analogy with the case of the apparent distinct-
ness of physical and mental properties. The mental and the physical, one
might say, seem different, but, it might be argued, this is compatible with
mental properties being identical to physical properties. It is just that we
represent mental properties in a special way, perhaps using a special “mode
of presentation”, which makes them seem distinct from physical properties.
Perhaps, similarly, EM650 and redness are one and the same property, but
we do not realize this because we represent it in two different ways. But
note that there is an important difference between the argument from the
mismatch problem against tracking theories and the well-known arguments
against physicalism. The arguments against physicalism rest on the obser-
vation that we cannot a priori infer mental facts from physical facts.21 In
contrast, the argument from the mismatch problem rests on the observation
19The mismatch problem for tracking theories is developed in detail in Mendelovici 2018,
Ch. 3.
20See Mendelovici 2018, Ch. 3 for more objections and replies.
21See, e.g., Chalmers 1996.
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that redness and EM650 have distinct higher-order properties. While a lack
of inferability might perhaps be explained in terms of ways of representing
(as opposed to a real difference in properties), differences in higher-order
properties between two properties entail non-identity (by Leibniz’s law). On
the face of it, the typical physicalist reply is not applicable.22
One might try to apply the reply at the level of higher-order properties.
One might say that properties such as those of being vivid, striking, and warm
are, despite appearances, physical features of electromagnetic properties, and
having to do with wavelengths and electromagnetic radiation are features of
redness. One might also say that redness in fact lacks some of the properties
that it seems to have, such as being categorical. By identifying certain higher-
order properties that we attribute to EM650 and redness and rejecting others,
one might attempt to undermine the argument from Leibniz’s law. Of course,
one can simply make the relevant claims, but, we maintain, there is little
motivation independent of saving the tracking theory to think that they are
true. It is always possible to save a theory by positing errors of judgment
and illusions of non-identity like this without independent evidence. Absent
independent reasons to think we are making such errors in this case, the reply
is unconvincing.
22There are arguments for dualism that take the same form as the above argument, such
as Descartes’ argument that the mind and the body must be distinct because the former
is unextended while the latter is extended. However, the best physicalist response to such
arguments is not to postulate some kind of illusion of non-identity, but instead to deny
that the mind (or the body) has (or lacks) the relevant property. This kind of reply seems
more plausible in the case of the mind than in the case of properties such as colors.
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Let us now turn to the functional role theory. The idea behind this theory
is that the overall pattern of functional relations between mental representa-
tions (and perhaps their components) determines their intentional contents.
The problem with this is easiest to see if we adopt the framework of the lan-
guage of thought (Fodor 1975). Let us say that our mental representations
are formulas in some inner language L. Causal connections that our inner
formulas and their constituent symbols stand in to other formulas and sym-
bols are supposed to determine their intentional contents. Let us model the
contents of formulas and their constituent symbols as intensions, which are
functions from possible worlds to entities or set-theoretic constructions out
of entities (truth values, objects, sets of objects, etc.). Let us assume that
the intension of a formula is determined by the intensions of its constituent
symbols and their logical arrangement. Causal role is supposed to determine
contents through such constraints as this:
Representations A and B represent contents CA and CB , respectively, in
virtue of their functional role only if it is the case that A causes B iff CA
entails CB .
Whatever the exact content-determining rules that one might want to
specify, the causal role account proceeds by mapping causal relations between
inner representations (broadly understood) to logical relations between their
contents: the causal relations between a certain set of representations de-
termine what logical relations (e.g., entailment) obtain between the contents
of representations of this set. The logical relations are then supposed to
17
Figure 1: Constructing alternative interpretations for mental symbols
determine the specific contents.
One problem is that logical relations are not sufficient for determining
contents.23 This can be shown using a method similar to that used in Put-
nam’s model-theoretic arguments (Putnam 1981, Appendix). Let us suppose
that there is at least one interpretation I1 of the symbols in L that is con-
sistent with their causal roles. We can think of I1 as assigning intensions to
all the non-logical symbols in L. Statements in L get their intensions compo-
sitionally. Assume that some predicate F1 in L is non-trivial at some world
w1, in that F1 is true of some objects at w1 (e.g., object a) and false of other
objects at w1 (e.g., object b). Now picture the set of all objects in w1 laid
on a surface such as the left rectangle in Figure 1. Imagine the extensions of
all names and predicates in L at w1 specified by I1 being marked as points
(for names) and shapes (for predicates) on this surface, as illustrated in the
left rectangle in Figure 1 for names “a” and “b” and predicates F1 and F2
(each symbol is shown next to its extension).24 Now take two objects such
23See Bourget MS for the argument that follows.
24The extensions of monadic predicates could be non-contiguous shapes without this
affecting the argument. A different drawing convention would have to be used for non-
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that one is in the extension of F1 at w1 and the other is not, for example,
the extensions of “a” and “b”, a and b. If we swap the places of a and b while
leaving all labels in place, we obtain new extensions for “a”, “b”, and F1, and
any other symbol that has a or b in its extension. The result of swapping a
and b is illustrated in the right rectangle of Figure 1. The new extension of
“a” is b, the new extension of “b” is a, and the new extension of predicates
are the same as on I1 except that a and b are swapped. This swapping pro-
cedure does not change the truth value of any statement at w1. We can thus
use this procedure to construct an alternative to I1 that makes all the same
statements true at any world and preserves all logical relationships between
statements: Let I2 be the interpretation that assigns to each expression e in
L the intension whose values are defined as follows: at w1, it is the value
at w1 of the intension assigned to e by I1, except that a and b are swapped
as described above; at any other world, it is the value at that world of the
intension assigned to e by I1. By construction, the intensions assigned by I2
yield the same truth-values as the intensions assigned by I1 for all sentences
of L and all worlds (including w1). So, all broadly logical relations such as
entailment between the sentences of L are exactly the same on J and on
I1. However, I1 and I2 are clearly different interpretations, since they assign
different intensions and extensions to “a”, “b”, and F1 (and potentially many
other mental symbols). This shows that determining logical relations be-
monadic properties, whose extensions are sets of n-tuples; we are setting those aside for
simplicity.
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tween contents is not sufficient for determining contents. Our Putnam-style
procedure constructs minimally differing extensions and intensions, but it
is easy to see that we can also construct massively different extensions and
intensions, since many worlds contain large numbers of objects, which can be
swapped. Even if some of our contents in fact are a little bit indeterminate,
it is implausible that they are massively indeterminate in this way.25
It might be thought that the long-arm functional role theory avoids the
underdetermination worry for functionalism, since it takes functional roles
and tracking relations to be relevant to content determination. For example,
it can say that certain color representations get determinate color contents
from tracking relations, while other color representations get their contents
25One might suggest that the functional role theory could determine probabilistic re-
lations rather than logical relations and that it would be harder to generate deviant in-
terpretations consistent with probabilistic relations (Fine (1977) discusses a view in the
ballpark, but he does not offer it as a theory of content). It may be that our swapping
procedure would not preserve probabilistic relations, but such a theory of mental content
would rely on the existence of objective, mind-independent conditional probabilities be-
tween arbitrary propositions, and we are skeptical that there are such probabilities (for
what it’s worth, Fine talks only about subjective probabilities).
Another possible response is that interpretations should be limited to functions that
assign “natural” intensions, which would presumably be intensions that assign “natural”
extensions. This is Lewis’ “reference magnetism” reply to Putnam. The resulting view
would not be a version of the functional role theory, but a view aiming to account for
intentionality in terms of both functional roles and reference magnetism. We are not
convinced that facts about natural kinds can play the required roles, since it is unclear
why natural kinds should constrain interpretation in the required way—in other words, it
is unclear why natural kinds should be “magnetic”. See Chalmers 2012 (extended edition,
20th excursus) for more objections to reference magnetism.
Other determinacy worries for conceptual role theories arise from “Kripkenstein”-style
considerations (see Kripke 1982). BonJour (1998, 176-7), Graham et al. (2007), Searle
(1990), Strawson (2008), and Kriegel (2011b) also raise worries concerning content deter-
minacy for tracking and functional role theories of intentionality. See also Pautz 2013 for
critical discussion.
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from their relations to these color representations. Tracking relations pro-
vide a representational system with determinate contents, which are then
transformed and passed around to other representations. However, insofar as
tracking relations play a role in determining content, long-arm functional role
theories inherit the tracking theory’s mismatch problem, since the content
allegedly provided by tracking relations is sometimes the wrong content.26
The underdetermination problem and the mismatch problem show that
the functional role theory and the tracking theory cannot attribute content
correctly, that they are empirically inadequate. The mismatch problem shows
that the tracking theory makes the wrong predictions in mismatch cases,
while the underdetermination problem shows that the functional role theory
cannot give the right answer in all cases of non-trivial predicates for in-
principle reasons. These are strong reasons to reject the views.27
We believe that PIT can attribute content correctly in all cases. Since it
does not take content to be determined by logical relations between repre-
sentations, it does not face the functional role theory’s in-principle worries
with correct content attribution. It can also yield the right answer in the
tracking theory’s mismatch cases. Some versions of PIT simply identify in-
tentional states with phenomenal states, while others take phenomenal states
to realize, constitute, or ground intentional states. Either way, PIT has the
26See Mendelovici 2018, Ch. 4.
27In Mendelovici and Bourget 2014 and Mendelovici 2018, Ch. 6, we argue that failure
of empirical adequacy cannot be made up for by having other virtues, such as that of being
naturalistic.
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resources to ascribe the right content in the case of experiences of redness,
since they involve a phenomenal character that matches the content we want
to ascribe. This phenomenal character might simply be identical to the con-
tent, or it might realize, constitute, or in some other way ground it. Similar
claims can be made about other mismatch cases for the tracking theory.
The preceding does not conclusively show that PIT ascribes correct, or
even determinate, content in all cases. Many objections to PIT concern cases
where it appears not to attribute content correctly. We turn to such cases in
the next section. If what we say there is correct, then PIT is arguably empir-
ically adequate, which provides significant support for the view, particularly
when its main competitors are not.28
4 Challenges to PIT
In the previous section, we outlined what we take to be some important mo-
tivations for PIT. We now turn to various challenging cases for the view. As
we will see, different ways of handling these cases result in different versions
of PIT. We will argue for an approach that results in a version of strong PIT,
which claims that all intentionality is phenomenal intentionality.
There are four main kinds of challenging cases we will consider: conscious
28Empirical adequacy, of course, is not enough to show that a view is viable. In order for
PIT to succeed, phenomenal consciousness has to be metaphysically sufficient to give rise
to intentionality. Another line of argument for PIT aims to establish that while tracking
and functional relations do not have the power to give rise to intentionality, phenomenal
consciousness does (see Mendelovici 2018, Chs. 4 and 5).
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thoughts with complex or abstract contents that don’t seem to correspond
to phenomenal states, intentional states with wide contents, standing propo-
sitional attitudes, and nonconscious representations of the kind described by
cognitive science. We will overview each kind of case in turn before providing
a sketch of how proponents of PIT might deal with them.
Thoughts. It seems that we have all sorts of complex or abstract thoughts,
some of which represent entities such as political systems, norms of behavior,
unobservable particles, and highly abstract mathematical entities. When we
have such thoughts, it might not seem that we have correspondingly com-
plex or abstract phenomenal states. Unlike in the case of experiences of
redness, where the feel of an experience seems to match what is represented,
in the case of complex or abstract thoughts, there seem to be no phenomenal
states matching what is represented. This casts doubt on strong PIT, which
requires that all intentionality is phenomenal intentionality. Moderate PIT,
which takes all intentionality to be phenomenal intentionality or derived from
phenomenal intentionality, is not committed to every intentional state cor-
responding to a matching phenomenal state. But the case of complex and
abstract thoughts also casts doubt on moderate PIT, since it is unclear that
such thoughts are related to phenomenal consciousness at all.
Wide intentional states. A problem also arises with wide intentional
states, which are states whose contents at least partly depend on factors ex-
ternal to the individual whose states they are. If Twin Earth intuitions are
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right (see Putnam 1975), then Oscar’s thought that water is wet represents
the content <H2O is wet>. But, on the plausible assumption that phenome-
nal states are internally determined, Oscar has no phenomenal state matching
<H2O>. Similarly, wide intentional states involving singular contents, such
as the thought you might have with the content <Justin Trudeau is cur-
rently in Europe>, do not come with a phenomenology uniquely matching
their singular contents. Here, too, the problematic cases directly challenge
strong PIT, since wide contents clearly do not seem to be phenomenal con-
tents, but the cases also challenge moderate PIT, since it is not clear how
such contents might be related to phenomenally intentional states.
Standing propositional attitudes. Standing propositional attitudes are
beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes that we count as having
even when we are not occurrently undergoing them. The problem with stand-
ing propositional attitudes is that there is nothing that it is like to have them.
For example, there is nothing it is like to believe that monkeys like bananas,
at least when not occurrently entertaining this belief. So, it does not seem
that standing propositional attitudes arise from phenomenal states, which
makes them problematic for strong PIT. It is also unclear how they might be
related to consciousness at all, which makes them problematic for moderate
PIT.
Nonconscious representational states. Cognitive science describes all
sorts of representational states that seem to be intentional but independent
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of any phenomenal states we might have. For example, representations oc-
curring in early visual processing and our tacit knowledge of grammar seem
to have no echo in phenomenal consciousness, yet one might hold that they
are intentional. Again, this would directly contradict strong PIT and cast
doubt on moderate PIT.
In addition to the above challenges, it might be claimed that phenomenal
states that might be thought to lack intentional content, such as feelings of
elation and headaches, are a challenge for PIT. Such cases pose a challenge
to representationalism, but they are not a problem for most versions of PIT,
which only claim that all intentional states arise from phenomenal states,
not that every phenomenal state gives rise to an intentional state. For this
reason, such cases do not concern us here.29
Note that standing states and the nonconscious representational states
posited by cognitive science are precisely the kinds of states that motivate
impure representationalism over pure representationalism and moderate PIT
over strong PIT, as we saw in Section 2. In what follows, we will reconsider
these motivations for moderate PIT, eventually arguing that strong PIT is
in fact correct.30
29See Block 1996 and Kind 2003, 2013 for worries with representationalism based on the
cases of moods, pain, and other such cases, and Harman 1990, Tye 1995, 2008, Dretske
1995, Byrne 2001, Crane 2003, Bain 2003, Seager and Bourget 2007, Mendelovici 2013a,
2014, Bourget and Mendelovici 2014, Bourget 2015, 2017b, and Smithies forthcoming for
defenses of representationalist treatments of such cases. See Mendelovici 2018, Appendix
B for further discussion of the relevance of such cases to PIT.
30Similar arguments can also show that pure representationalism is defensible. See
Mendelovici 2010, 2013a, and 2014 and Bourget 2010a,b.
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For any problematic state, there are three main strategies that a propo-
nent of moderate PIT might adopt. Inflationism claims that the problem-
atic state, despite appearances, has rich phenomenal character from which
its content arises. Eliminativism denies that the problematic state exists or
has any intentionality at all. Derivativism claims that, while the problem-
atic intentional state does not arise solely from phenomenal consciousness, it
derives from intentional states that do. The first two strategies, but not the
third, are open both to the proponent of strong PIT and to the proponent
of moderate PIT.
We will now consider how each kind of strategy can be applied to the
problematic cases, focusing on our favored strategies.
4.1 Standing propositional attitudes
In the case of standing propositional attitudes, inflationism seems to be a
nonstarter: there is clearly no phenomenology associated with most of our
standing beliefs and other standing propositional attitudes. A more promis-
ing strategy is an eliminativist strategy that flat-out denies the existence of
anything answering to the notion of a standing propositional attitude. While
we are sympathetic to this strategy, we think a more nuanced eliminativist
strategy is preferable. We will turn to it after considering a related deriva-
tivist strategy.
One promising derivativist strategy takes propositional attitudes to be
dispositions to have certain related occurrent beliefs, occurrent desires, or
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other thoughts, whose contents are either phenomenal contents or derived
from phenomenal contents. On this view, which we might call derivativist
dispositionalism, propositional attitudes and their contents derive from dis-
positions to have occurrent thoughts, whose contents are either phenomenal
contents or derived from phenomenal contents. For example, your belief that
monkeys like bananas might amount to a set of complex dispositions to have
occurrent beliefs to the effect that monkeys like bananas (or perhaps occur-
rent beliefs that are entailed by such occurrent beliefs) whenever relevant.31
There is also an eliminativist version of the dispositionalist strategy, which
we find preferable (though there is another view we are also partial to,
which we will describe in Section 4.3). This eliminativist dispositionalism
accepts that we have dispositions to have various occurrent thoughts and
that these play many of the roles we associate with standing propositional
attitudes. Unlike the derivativist dispositionalist, however, the eliminativist
dispositionalist denies that the relevant dispositional states qualify as inten-
tional states. Recall that we defined intentionality ostensively by pointing
to paradigm cases in thought and visual experience. Since a disposition to
do X is different in nature from doing X, the relevant dispositions are differ-
ent in nature from our paradigm cases, so our definition plausibly excludes
31Searle’s (1989, 1990) potentialism is arguably best understood as a form of derivativism
about standing propositional attitudes. Searle takes standing states that are potentially
conscious to derive their intentionality from the phenomenal states they are disposed
to cause. Kriegel’s interpretivism (2011a,b) also provides a derivativist view of standing
propositional attitudes, taking non-phenomenally conscious intentional states to be derived
from the phenomenal intentional states of an ideal observer applying intentional systems
theory to subjects based on their phenomenal intentional states and behavior.
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them.32 Of course, whether or not the relevant dispositional states qualify
as intentional states depends on how we define “intentionality”. If we were to
count propositional attitudes as paradigm cases of intentionality, then elimi-
nativist dispositionalism would likely end up being classified as a derivativist
dispositionalism.
Unlike the eliminativist strategy that flat-out denies the existence of any-
thing answering to the notion of a standing propositional attitude, both
derivativist and eliminativist dispositionalism attempt to be somewhat ac-
commodating to our prior views of standing propositional attitudes, accept-
ing that we have states playing the roles of standing beliefs, standing desires,
and other standing states, even though their nature is merely dispositional,
and perhaps not even genuinely intentional. In order for these strategies to
succeed at accommodating standing propositional attitudes, however, PIT
needs to be able to accommodate occurrent thoughts with the relevant con-
tents, which might include contents that are complex or wide. We turn to
these challenging cases below, starting with the case of wide thoughts.
4.2 Wide thoughts
In the case of occurrent thoughts with wide contents, inflationism, again,
seems to be a nonstarter. Take for example the occurrent thought that
monkeys like bananas. The wide content of this thought relates creatures
32See also Strawson 1994, p. 167, Mendelovici 2018, Ch. 8, and Pitt MS for applications
of the eliminativist strategy in the case of standing propositional attitudes.
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with a certain kind of DNA or evolutionary history to bananas. It seems
implausible that there is a phenomenal character of thought that captures
this specific kind of DNA or evolutionary history.
One kind of eliminativist strategy might simply deny that there are any
wide contents, perhaps suggesting that we are mistaking referents for wide
contents (see Farkas 2008a) or that our intuitions supporting wide contents
are mistaken and all we really have are narrow contents (Pitt 1999, 2011).
The view we will ultimately defend is also eliminativist, but it is eliminativist
in a slightly more accommodating way.33
The derivativist strategy is quite plausible and widely endorsed among
advocates of PIT. One natural version of this strategy takes thoughts to
have both wide and narrow contents, with the wide contents deriving from
the narrow contents. These narrow contents are phenomenal contents (or
at least derived contents that are derived from phenomenal contents).34 For
example, the thought that water is wet might have a descriptive narrow
content like <the clear watery stuff around here is wet>, which, in certain
contexts, determines derived wide contents like <H2O is wet>. We will call
this strategy the derivativist descriptivist strategy for wide thoughts, since it
takes wide contents to be derived from broadly-speaking descriptive narrow
contents.35
33See Siewert 1998, Kriegel 2007, Farkas 2008a, Pitt 1999, 2011, and Mendelovici 2010,
2018 for applications of the eliminativist strategy to wide states.
34Such views are defended by Horgan and Tienson 2002a, Horgan et al. (2004), Loar
(2003), Bourget (2010a), and Chalmers (2010), among others. Mendelovici (2010, 2018)
defends an eliminativist version of this kind of view.
35This strategy requires a broadly descriptivist view such as that defended by Jack-
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As in the case of derivativist dispositionalism, there is also an eliminativist
version of the descriptivist strategy. According to eliminativist descriptivism,
thoughts have narrow descriptive contents which determine wide contents,
but these wide contents are not intentionally represented by thoughts. While
we might represent them on some loose sense of “represent”, our relation to
them does not qualify as an instance of intentionality. If our paradigm cases
of intentionality are all cases of phenomenal intentionality, it is quite likely
that the representation of wide contents is of a different nature than our
paradigm cases, and so does not qualify as a kind of intentionality. Again,
whether a content qualifies as intentional turns largely on how we define
“intentionality”.
Both derivativist and eliminativist descriptivism require that our thoughts
represent narrow descriptive contents that determine the desired wide con-
tents, but it is unclear that PIT can accommodate the required descriptive
contents. The problem is that many descriptive contents would have to be
quite nuanced and complex in order to fix on the desired wide contents, and
it is not clear that such contents are phenomenal contents or somehow de-
rived from phenomenal contents. For example, in order to fix on the natural
kind monkey, we might need causal or metalinguistic descriptive contents like
<the species around here that causes such-and-such superficial effects on ob-
son (1998). A view in a similar spirit is developed by Chalmers (2002a). Of course,
descriptivism faces well-known objections (e.g., from Kripke 1980). We think these objec-
tions have been adequately addressed by descriptivists (see, e.g., Jackson 1998, 2003a,b,
Chalmers 2002b, 2012), and focus here on objections to descriptivism that are special to
PIT’s application of the view.
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servers> or <the species called “monkey” around here>. But, since it does
not seem that we have phenomenal states matching such narrow contents
every time we think about monkeys, it is not clear how PIT can accommo-
date such descriptive contents. This issue for the descriptivist strategy is
of a piece with the general problem of thoughts with abstract or complex
contents, to which we now turn.
4.3 Complex and abstract thoughts
Many phenomenal intentionality theorists have applied an inflationist strat-
egy in the case of thoughts with complex or abstract contents, arguing that
they have a sufficiently rich phenomenology to account for their rich con-
tents.36 Proponents of rich cognitive phenomenology have attempted to bring
out this phenomenology in various ways. One way is through the use of phe-
nomenal contrast cases. For example, you might be asked to compare your
phenomenology when hearing the words “birds fly” with that of someone who
does not know what the word “bird” means. This person might have some au-
ditory phenomenology corresponding to the word “bird”, but she seems to be
missing something that you have. This something is the rich phenomenology
of thought corresponding to the (perhaps narrow) idea of a bird.37
For our part, we are not entirely convinced of the inflationist strategy.
36See, e.g., Strawson (1994, 2008, 2011), Siewert (1998, 2011), Horgan and Tienson
(2002a), Horgan et al. (2004), Chudnoff (2015), and Pitt (2009, 2011).
37For such arguments, see especially Strawson 1994, Siewert 1998, Horgan and Tien-
son 2002a, Chudnoff 2015, and Pitt 2009. Koksvik (2015) questions the methodology of
phenomenal contrast arguments.
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We agree that phenomenal contrast cases show that there is something in
consciousness when one is thinking about monkeys, birds, or flying, but this
something is not the full idea, even the full narrow idea, of a monkey, bird,
or of flying. It seems to us that the contents that are determined by the phe-
nomenology of conscious thoughts are gisty, partial, or schematic compared
to the full narrow contents that we might want to attribute to these thoughts,
which might include descriptive contents of the sort described above, or even
just rough characterizations like <a winged feathery animal that lays eggs
and flies>. Bourget (2017c, 2018) argues that the phenomenal contents as-
sociated with abstract or complex thoughts are often largely symbolic, rep-
resenting words without precise meanings.
An alternative approach to complex thoughts is derivativist: Although
the occurrent thoughts we typically have don’t have phenomenal properties
that capture the full narrow contents that we want to attribute to them, they
are inferentially or otherwise connected with complex or abstract thoughts
whose phenomenal properties determine these fuller contents. One might
say that typical occurrent thoughts have the complex narrow contents they
have in virtue of bearing such connections to more complex thoughts. There
are different views on what the relevant connections are. We will focus on a
view that takes the relevant connections to be determined by our dispositions
to take ourselves to mean one content by another. According to this view,
which we will call derivativist self-ascriptivism, we derivatively represent a
content by having a disposition to ascribe it to ourselves or our own mental
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states in certain circumstances. In order for such an approach to succeed,
we must further say that the relevant contents of these self-ascriptions are
phenomenally represented.38
To see how this view works, suppose, for example, that you are talking
about physicalism with a colleague. In the course of this discussion, you say,
“At least we can agree that phenomenal properties supervene on physical
properties.” Suppose that your colleague asks what you mean by “super-
vene”. You might pause for a brief moment before producing an elucidation
of supervenience such as this:
Supervenience Properties of class A supervene on properties of class B if
and only if any possible worlds that are alike in their B properties are
like in their A properties.
It seems clear that, prior to pausing and reflecting on the matter, you did
not have an occurrent grasp of supervenience as that relation that Super-
venience spells out. For instance, when you had the first thought about
supervenience, you didn’t have in your consciousness anything like the idea
of a possible world. Still, we are inclined to say that Supervenience was
involved in the content of your thought because, on reflection, you ascribe
38This kind of self-ascriptivist strategy is developed in detail in Mendelovici 2018 (see
also Mendelovici forthcoming), though it is given an eliminativist spin (see below). Bourget
2018 also defends a view along these lines. Pautz (2013) offers an alternative derivativist
strategy for complex thoughts, the consciousness-based best systems theory, which allows
states to derive intentionality from their functional relations with other states with phe-
nomenal intentionality. Kriegel’s (2011a and 2011b) interpretivism might also be applied
to the case of thought (see n. 31). See also Loar, 2003a,b and Bourget 2010a for other
derivativist views of thought content.
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this content to your thought. According to derivativist self-ascriptivism,
such self-ascriptions have phenomenal intentionality and your thought about
supervenience derivatively represents the full definition of supervenience in
virtue of your disposition to have such phenomenally conscious self-ascriptive
thoughts.
A few points of clarification are in order. First, in order to derivatively
represent a particular content, you merely need to be disposed to form the
relevant self-ascriptions; it does not matter whether you ever actually do.
Second, the view can be refined by specifying the relevant dispositions’ con-
ditions of manifestation. The more idealized these conditions are, the less
likely we are to ever have the relevant self-ascriptive thoughts, but the more
likely these thoughts are to reflect our all-things-considered best understand-
ing relating to our thoughts and concepts.39 Third, any given self-ascriptive
thought need only partially specify the full unpacking of any given thought.
On the resulting view, thoughts with relatively impoverished phenomenal
contents can manage to derivatively represent rich and complex contents, con-
tents that we might never be able to entertain in a single conscious thought.
As in the case of dispositionalist and descriptivist strategies, there is
39Thanks to an anonymous reviewer, who worried that self-ascriptivism does not allow
us to make mistaken judgments as to what we represent, for prompting this clarification.
The worry is avoided because mistakes are possible outside of the relevant dispositions’
conditions of manifestation. For example, we might say that the relevant circumstances
are “good” ones in which subjects are awake, alert, and given amply opportunity to re-
flect. When subjects fail to meet these conditions, their self-ascriptive thoughts do not
determine their derived contents and so they can be mistaken about those contents. See
also Mendelovici 2010, §10.3.1 and 2018, §7.3 for further discussion.
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an eliminativist version of the self-ascriptivist strategy, which is the view
that we endorse. Eliminativist self-ascriptivism accepts the derivativist self-
ascriptivist’s story about dispositions to self-ascribe complex contents but
denies that we intentionally represent these contents. To illustrate and mo-
tivate the eliminativist version of self-ascriptivism, note first that there are
really two kinds of content at play in situations such as that of your discussion
with your colleague above. When you first used the word “supervenience”,
you did not grasp the full meaning of this term for you as spelled out in
Supervenience, but your mind was not completely empty. There was some-
thing before your mind, something that you grasped mentally as you were
speaking. Plausibly, you had a gisty sense of what supervenience is. So it
seems that your first, fleeting thought about Supervenience has two contents:
a gisty content, which you initially grasped, and the full content spelled out
by Supervenience, which you only grasped on reflection. We can call the first
the immediate content of the thought, and the second its reflective content.
Immediate and reflective contents can coincide, but they can also diverge, as
seems to be the case in the present example. According to self-ascriptivism,
the first kind of content is phenomenal content, while the second kind of
content is derived content.
We defined “intentionality” by pointing to introspectively accessible paradigm
cases. Now, it seems that introspection does not reveal anything about re-
flective contents (though reflection often does). So, our paradigm cases of
intentionality are cases of the representation of immediate contents. In or-
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der to count as intentional, reflective contents would have to be the same
in nature as immediate contents. However, there are important differences
between immediate contents and reflective contents.40 For one, reflective
contents arise from dispositional connections between mental states, whereas
immediate contents arguably arise from the intrinsic phenomenal properties
of thoughts. For these kinds of reasons, we don’t take the representation
of reflective contents such as Supervenience to be instances of intentionality.
Our disposition to self-ascribe complex and abstract contents might create a
vast illusion of our intentionally representing such contents, whereas in fact
the intentional contents of thoughts are limited to their somewhat impover-
ished immediate contents. We do, however, have dispositions to self-ascribe
more complex or abstract contents, but, so long as we are not occurrently
entertaining them, we do not intentionally represent them.
Recall that the dispositionalist and descriptivist strategies mentioned
above pass the buck to a theory of complex thought content. We are now in
a position to see how the self-ascriptivist view of complex thought content
can plug into and complete the dispositionalist and descriptivist views. The
narrow descriptions required by the descriptivist strategy are a matter of our
dispositions to self-ascribe descriptive contents to our occurrent thoughts.
40Mendelovici (2018, §7.5) argues that one of the most important differences between
the having of immediate contents and the having of reflective contents is that the latter is
relative to a self-ascriber, the subject who has the dispositions to ascribe the contents to
herself, whereas the former is not. Bourget (2018) argues that phenomenal intentionality
and non-phenomenal intentionality play different causal and rational roles, the former
allowing for genuinely content-responsive thinking and the latter allowing only for an
emulation of content-responsive thinking.
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These descriptions, together with how the world is, fix the wide content of
those thoughts. Standing propositional attitudes are a matter of dispositions
to have occurrent thoughts with descriptive and/or wide contents. On this
picture, one problematic kind of content or state is built up out of another,
based on a foundation of dispositions to have self-ascriptions whose relevant
contents are purely phenomenal. We call this picture the scaffolding view.
One can have a derivativist, eliminativist, or mixed version of the scaffolding
view, depending on whether one takes any of the relevant non-phenomenal
contents to be genuinely intentionally represented or not. As we’ve already
noted, we take each kind of non-phenomenal representation to be different
in kind from genuine intentionality, so we prefer the eliminativist version of
the scaffolding view to the alternative derivativist and mixed versions.41
While we find the scaffolding view attractive, we believe that self-ascriptivism
alone can accommodate all the same sorts of states. Self-ascriptivism can
directly account for wide intentional states and standing propositional atti-
tudes, since, in both cases, we have dispositions to self-ascribe the relevant
states or contents: In the case of the wide thought that water is wet, you
are disposed to self-ascribe the content <H2O is wet> in that you are dis-
posed to take yourself to be thinking that whatever happens to be the clear
watery stuff around here (i.e., whatever is the referent of your water descrip-
tion) is wet. H2O is what happens to be the clear watery stuff around here,
41For versions of the scaffolding view, see Horgan and Tienson 2002a, Bourget 2010a,
and Mendelovici 2010.
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so you are disposed to self-ascribe this content to yourself. In effect, we
represent wide contents by being disposed to have self-ascriptions that use
rather than mention narrow descriptive contents. Similarly, self-ascriptivism
can accommodate standing propositional attitudes: we self-ascribe stand-
ing propositional attitudes in that we are disposed to take ourselves to have
them.42,43
4.4 Nonconscious representational states
Let us now turn to the case of nonconscious representational states posited
by cognitive science. An inflationist strategy might claim that at least some
such states are in fact phenomenally conscious and have phenomenal inten-
tionality, even though we are not aware of this. Just as you are not aware
of your neighbor’s phenomenal states, your brain might house phenomenal
states that you are not aware of. Whether these states are your states or the
states of some other subject depends in part on how we understand subjects
of experience, but it is irrelevant for the inflationist’s main point, which is
that the relevant states might very well have phenomenal intentionality that
we are unaware of. While this might be plausible for some of the relevant
nonconscious representational states (e.g., blindsight states), it is doubtful
that all the relevant states involve hidden phenomenal characters. In general,
42See Mendelovici 2018, Chs. 8–9.
43The scaffolding view is compatible with self-ascriptivism across the board; there might
be more than one way in which we come to have standing propositional attitudes or wide
thoughts.
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there are too many kinds of nonconscious representational states represent-
ing too many introspectively inaccessible contents for it to be plausible that
they are all phenomenal.44
The derivativist strategy, which claims that the relevant states are de-
rived from phenomenal intentional states (or from states that are eventually
derived from phenomenal intentional states) might stand a better chance of
accommodating all of the nonconscious representational states posited by
cognitive science. For instance, Kriegel’s interpretivism (2011a, 2011b) takes
nonconscious intentionality to be derived from the phenomenal intentional-
ity of an ideal interpreter who uses intentional systems theory to ascribe
intentionality to nonconscious mental states (see also n. 31). Since this ideal
interpreter is motivated by some of the same considerations as cognitive sci-
entists, her content attributions are likely to match up with those of cognitive
science.45
The main motivation for a derivativist strategy is a desire to be con-
ciliatory with what we might take to be the standard view of the relevant
nonconscious states. However, we prefer an eliminativist strategy, which we
believe is at least as conciliatory with the standard view. The notions of
representation operative in cognitive science are arguably either based on
tracking or computational or other functional roles, or presumed to pick
44Pitt (2009), Bourget (2010a, 2017c), and Mendelovici (2018, Ch. 8) argue for an
inflationist strategy along these lines for at least some cases.
45Bourget (2010a) suggests a derivativist strategy for certain nonconscious occurrent
representational states. See also Horgan et al. (2004).
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out something that is nothing over tracking relations and functional roles.
Although we don’t think tracking or functional roles can account for inten-
tionality as we’ve defined it, we accept that internal states track things and
have various functional roles, and that these are important features of these
states that can serve many explanatory purposes. We also accept that there
might be useful notions of representation that are based on such features. So
we can agree with most of the claims characterizing the standard view. The
only potential disagreement concerns whether the nonconscious representa-
tion posited by cognitive science is the same kind of thing as intentionality
in our sense, which would require that it be the same kind of thing as the
conscious intentionality we can introspect. In the previous section, we briefly
overviewed reasons for thinking that the conscious intentionality we can in-
trospect is not a matter of tracking or functional roles. If these arguments
are sound, then intentionality (in our sense) is not the same kind of thing
as the representation exhibited by the nonconscious representational states
posited by cognitive science. The key point here is that our disagreement
with the standard view concerns the nature of conscious intentionality, not
the nature of the nonconscious representational states posited by cognitive
science, making the eliminativist strategy quite conciliatory when it comes
to the nature of the nonconscious representational states posited by cognitive
science.46
46See also Horgan et al. 2004 and Mendelovici and Bourget 2014, Bourget and Mende-
lovici 2016, Bourget 2010a, 2017c, 2018, and Mendelovici 2018, Ch. 8 for arguments for
the claim that the eliminativist strategy with respect to nonconscious occurrent represen-
tational states is in line with the standard view of such states. Mendelovici (2018, Ch. 8)
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have outlined some possible views on the relationship be-
tween phenomenal consciousness and intentionality. Our focus has been on
our preferred view, PIT, suggesting that one of the strongest arguments for
PIT is based on the empirical inadequacy of its main competitors. We have
argued that PIT can avoid the problems facing its competitors, but it too
faces some challenges. We have considered four central kinds of challenging
cases for PIT and three strategies that can be applied to each case. For
each kind of challenging case, there are several attractive options, yielding a
plethora of plausible versions of PIT. We have argued for a largely elimina-
tivist position in all cases, which results in a version of strong PIT.
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